We apply recent advances in propensity-score matching (PSM) 
Introduction
Antipoverty programs often require that participants must work to obtain benefits. Such "workfare" programs have been turned to in crises such as due to macroeconomic or agroclimatic shocks, in which a large number of poor able-bodied people have become unemployed.
Typically, the main aim is to raise the current incomes of poor families hurt by the crisis. (On the arguments and evidence on this class of interventions see Ravallion (1991 Ravallion ( , 1999 , Besley and Coate (1992) , Lipton and Ravallion (1995) ).
To assess the distributional impact of such a program, we need to measure the income gains to participants conditional on pre-intervention income, where the income gain is the difference between household income with the program and that without it. This conditional impact estimate is commonly referred to as a program's "benefit incidence." The "with" data can be collected without much difficulty. But the "without" data are fundamentally unobserved, since an individual cannot be both a participant and a non-participant of the same program. This is a well known, and fundamental problem in all causal inferences (Holland, 1986 ).
An assumption that is sometimes made in benefit incidence analysis is that the gross wages paid are an adequate measure of the income gains to participants. (See, for example, the various assessments of the cost-effectiveness of workfare programs reviewed in Subbarao et al., 1997) . This assumption would be reasonable if labor supply to a workfare program came only from the unemployed. But that is generally not the case in practice. Moreover, even if a participating worker was unemployed at the time she joined the program, there is an opportunity cost of participation. Joining the program will leave less time for job-search. There are likely to be effects on time allocation within the household. For example, Datt and Ravallion (1994) find that other family members took up the displaced productive activities when someone joined a workfare program in rural India. Such behavioral responses will reduce foregone income, though we can still expect it to be positive. Without taking proper account of foregone incomes we cannot know the true incidence of program benefits.
This paper estimates the income gains from a workfare program and how those gains vary with pre-intervention incomes. To draw a statistical comparison group to workfare participants from a larger contemporaneous and comparable survey of non-participants, we apply recent advances in propensity-score matching (PSM) methods, following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) . Matching methods have been quite widely used in evaluations but there have as yet been few economic applications of matching based on the propensity score. Some exceptions are Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, (1997) , Wahba (1998,1999) , Hotz, Imbens and Mortimer (1999) , Lechner (1999) and Lopez (1999) .
We study the Trabajar Program, an antipoverty program of the Government of Argentina, supported by a World Bank loan and technical assistance. A number of features of this setting lend themselves to PSM methods. As is common in a crisis, other evaluation methods requiring randomization or a baseline (pre-intervention) survey were not feasible. However, it was possible to do a post-intervention survey in which the same questionnaire was administered to both the participants and the non-participants, and in a setting in which it was plausible that both groups came from the same economic environment. The Trabajar participant could be identified in the larger survey.
Furthermore, using kernel density estimation techniques, we are able to ensure that participants are matched with the non-participants over a common region of the matching variables. Any remaining bias in the matching estimator can thus be attributed to unobserved characteristics. The design of the program can be expected to entail considerable rationing of participation according to observables. The sample of non-participants is very likely to include people who wanted to participate but were unable to do so due to say non-availability of the program. While our application is well suited to PSM, bias due to unobservables cannot be ruled out.
A further advantage of PSM methods for this problem is that they lend themselves naturally to studying the heterogeneity of program impact. This is of obvious interest for an antipoverty program, in which knowledge of the distribution of impacts conditional on preintervention incomes is crucial to judging the program's success.
The following section discusses the evaluation problem and our methods. Section 3 describes the Trabajar program and our data. Section 4 presents the results, and offers an economic interpretation. Section 5 concludes.
Estimating the Benefit Incidence of a Workfare Program
In assessing the gains from a workfare program, the workers' earnings are naturally the main focus, and that will be the case here. However, it should be noted that earnings net of foregone income are only one of the potential benefits. There could also be risk benefits from knowing that the program exists. There may well also be benefits from the outputs, depending on (amongst other things) how well targeted the workfare projects are to poor areas.
We first outline a simple model of self-targeting which provides arguments for workfare, pointing to the importance of foregone incomes. We then describe the matching method we use to estimate foregone incomes.
The Problem
The following rudimentary model has the essential features necessary to characterize the "self-targeting" argument often made in favor of workfare (Ravallion, 1991 assessing foregone incomes will overestimate the impact on income poverty. This holds for a broad-class of poverty measures (Atkinson, 1987) .
How can one estimate the foregone income? This is a counterfactual concept in that participants' incomes in the absence of the program are missing data. There are several methods one might adopt to assess the counter-factual, drawing on the literature on impact evaluation.
One can do reflexive comparisons by collecting baseline data on probable (eligible) participants before the program was instituted. These data are then compared with data on the same individuals once they have actually participated in the program. Alternatively, potential participants are identified and data are collected from them. However, only a random subsample of these individuals is actually allowed to participate in the program. Another possible approach is to use propensity-score matching methods, following Rubin (1983, 1985) , Wahba (1998, 1999) and Heckman et al. (1997 Heckman et al. ( , 1998 . Here, the counterfactual group is constructed by matching program participants to non-participants from a larger survey such as the population census or an annual national budget survey. The matches are chosen on the basis of similarities in observed characteristics. We use matching methods on non-experimental data to evaluate the impact of the program.
Since most countries now have a nationally representative socio-economic survey instrument, the marginal cost of using PSM only includes the survey of program participants.
The same survey instrument can then be taken to a sample of participants after the program has started, possibly with an extra module to cover specific questions related to the program. PSM estimates will be reliable provided participants and controls have the same distributions of unobserved characteristics. Failure of this condition to hold is often referred to as the problem of "selection bias" in econometrics, or "selection on unobservables" (Heckman and Robb, 1985) .
Secondly, the support for the comparison and the program participants should be the same.
Finally, it is desirable that the same questionnaire be administered to both groups; and participants and controls are from the same economic environment.
A Feasible Method of Estimating Benefit Incidence
Suppose we have data on N participants in a workfare program, and another random sample of size rN (r>1) from the population. The second set of data could be the population census or the national household survey that has information relevant to the participation decisions of the individuals. Using the two sets of data, we try to match the N program participants with a comparison group of non-participants from the population.
The two surveys must include information that helps predict participation in the program.
Let X be the vector of such variables. Ideally, one would match a participant with a nonparticipant using the entire dimension of X, i.e., a match is only declared if there are two individuals, one in each of the two samples, for whom the value of X is identical. This is impractical, however, because the dimension of X could be very high. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that matching can be performed conditioning on P(X) alone rather than on X, where
is the probability of participating conditional on X, the "propensity score"
of X. If outcomes without the intervention are independent of participation given X then they are also independent of participation given P(X). This is a powerful result, since it reduces a potentially high-dimensional matching problem to a single dimensional problem.
The propensity score is calculated for each observation in the participant and the comparison-group samples using standard discrete choice parametric or semi-parametric models.
Since some studies show that the impact estimator is robust to the choice of the discrete choice model, we use standard parametric likelihood methods to compute the propensity scores. (Todd, 1995) . Propensity Score Matching (PSM) then uses the estimated P(X)'s or a monotone function of it to select comparison subjects.
We used the odds ratio p i = P i /(1-P i ), where P i is the estimated probability of participation for individual i, to construct matched-pairs on the basis of how close the scores are across the two samples. The nearest neighbor to the i'th participant is thus defined as the non-participant
2 over all j in the set of non-participants, where p(X k ) is the predicted odds ratio for observation k. Sometimes nearest neighbors can be far apart in terms of the distance metric between the propensity scores of the treated and comparison subjects. So we match using the "propensity score caliper" defined by:
for ε arbitrarily small.
In their comparisons of non-experimental methods of evaluating a training program with a benchmark experimental design, Heckman et. al (1997) find that failure to compare participants and controls at common values of matching variables is the single most important source of bias  considerably more important than the classic econometric problem of selection bias due to differences in unobervables. To ensure that we are matching only over common values of the propensity scores, we estimated the density of the scores for the non-participants at 100 points over the range of scores. We use a biweight kernel density estimator and the optimal bandwidth value suggested by Silverman (1986) . Once we estimate the density for the nonparticipants, we exclude those non-participants for whom the estimated density is equal to zero.
We also exclude 2% of the sample from the top and bottom of the non-participant distribution.
The mean impact estimator of the program is given by:
where Y j1 is the post-intervention household income of participant j, Y ij0 is the household income of the i th non-participant matched to the j th participant, P is the total number of participants, NP the total number of non-participants and the W ij 's are the weights applied in calculating the average income of the matched non-participants. There are several different types of parametric and non-parametric weights that one can use. In this paper we use three different weights and thereby report three different matching estimators. Our first matching estimator is the "nearest neighbor" estimator where we find the closest non-participant match for each participant and the impact estimator is a simple mean over the income difference between the participant and its matched non-participant. In calculating our mean impact, if the income of the participant is less than the income of the matched non-participant, we assume that the true impact is zero.
If the comparison sample is large enough then "m-to-one" matching with m≥1 can be used to reduce the standard errors of comparison. However, the gain in precision achieved by increasing the matched comparison sample size is typically modest (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985; Rubin and Thomas, 1996) . So we construct a second estimator which takes the average income of the closest five matched non-participants and compares this to the participant's income. Following Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd, (1998) we also report a kernelweighted estimator where the weights are given by:
where
and where a N0 is the bandwidth parameter, K(.) is the kernel as a function of the difference in the propensity scores of the participants and the non-participants. In our analysis, we have used Silverman's (1986) optimal bandwidth parameter and a biweight kernel function. (The results were very similar using either a rectangular or parzen kernel function.)
Lastly, in each of these cases, the associated standard errors of the mean impact estimator are also calculated. We calculated both the parametric and bootstrapped standard errors for the impact estimators. The two were virtually identical. We report the parametric standard errors in the paper.
The Program and Data
Argentina experienced a sharp increase in unemployment in mid 1990s, reaching 18% in 1996/97. This was clearly hurting the poor; for example, the unemployment rate (on a comparable basis) was 39% amongst the poorest decile in terms of household income per capita in Greater Buenos Aires (Permanent Household Survey (EPH) for Greater Buenos Aires in May 1996). Unemployment rates fell steadily as income per person increases.
The Trabajar Program
In response to this macroeconomic crisis, and with financial and technical support from the World Bank, the Government of Argentina introduced the Trabajar II program in May 1997.
This was a greatly expanded and reformed version of a previous pilot program, Trabajar I. The program aimed to help in two ways. Firstly, by providing short-term work at relatively low wages, the program aimed to self-select unemployed workers from poor families. Secondly, the scheme tried to locate socially useful projects in poor areas to help repair and develop local infrastructure. This paper only assesses progress against the first objective (on the second see Ravallion, 2000) .
The sub-projects are proposed by local governmental and non-governmental organizations who must cover the non-wage costs. The proposals have to be viable with respect to criteria, and are given priority according to ex ante assessments of how well targeted they are There are other questions that the evaluation can answer. Trabajar I had been targeted to middle aged heads of households (typically male). However, under Trabajar II it was decided not to impose this restriction since there was a risk of increasing the forgone income of participants by constraining their ability to adjust work allocation within the household in response to the program. In practice however, the restrictions on participation may still have been imposed at the local level. If that were the case on average in all localities, then one might expect to find that there are unexploited income gains by increasing participation by the young and by women. We will test this.
Data
Two household surveys are used. One is of program participants and the other is a national sample survey, used to obtain the comparison group. Both surveys were done by the government's statistics office, the Instituto Nacional De Estadistica Y Census (INDEC), using the same questionnaire, the same interviewing teams and at approximately the same time.
The national survey is the Encuesta de Desarrollo Social (EDS), a large socio-economic survey done in mid-1997. The EDS sample covers the population residing in localities with 5,000 or more residents. According to the 1991 census, such localities totaled to 420 in Argentina and represented 96% of the urban population and 84% of the total population. 114 localities were sampled. The comparison group is constructed from the EDS.
The second data set is a special purpose sample of Trabajar participants done for the purpose of this evaluation. The sample design involved a number of steps. First among all the projects approved between April and June of 1997, 300 projects in localities which were in the EDS sample frame were randomly selected, with an additional 50 projects chosen for replacement purposes. The administrative records on project participants did not include addresses, so Ministry of Labor (MOL) had to obtain these by field work. From these 350 projects, the Labor Ministry could find the addresses of nearly 4,500 participants. However, for various reasons about 1,000 of these were not interviewed. The reasons given by INDEC were that the addresses were found to be outside the sample frame, or they were incomplete, or nonexistent, or that all household members were absent when the interviewer went to interview the household, or that they did not want to respond. In all 3,500 participant households were surveyed. (The number of Trabajar participants during May 1997-January 1998 was 65,321.)
We restrict the analysis to households with complete income information, and those who completed all relevant questions asked of them. Also, we only consider participants who were actually working in a Trabajar project at the time they were surveyed. Since the EDS questionnaire does not ask income-related questions to those below 15 or above 64 years of age,
we also had to restrict our attention to the age group 15-64 years for our analysis. We focus on 
Results and Interpretation

Descriptive Statistics
In Table 1 , we present selected descriptive statistics for the Trabajar and EDS samples.
Those in the Trabajar sample have lower average income, higher average family size, are more likely to have borrowed to meet their basic needs, receive less from informal sources, are more likely to participate in some form of political organization, and are less likely to own various consumer durables (with the exception of a color TV, which appears to be a necessity of life in Argentina.) Using the matching methods described above, we will now see whether that assumption is justified, and how much it matters to an assessment of average gains and their incidence.
Propensity-Score Matching Estimates
Estimating the propensity score is a crucial step in using matching as an evaluation strategy. Different practices have been adopted to choose a suitable specification of the participation equation (see, for example, Dehejia and Wahba, 1998; Heckman et. al., 1998) . The underlying principle is that pre-intervention variables-that are not influenced by participation in the program-should be included in the regression. Existing applications to the evaluation of job training programs in the US have found the employment histories of individuals to be good predictors of participation. In our data we do not have any information on employment histories prior to the implementation of the program. However, unlike the job-training program studies, we have substantial information on community characteristics in which the individuals resides and on the household characteristics of the individuals as well as data on their educational and demographic backgrounds. We determined that there were over two hundred potential variables at our disposal that could reasonably be treated as exogenous to participation. Amongst these variables, many of the community characteristics were very important predictors of participation, as were a number of household characteristics. We estimated alternative logistic models to predict participation in the program and selected a final model chosen on the basis of the likelihood function. Table 3 presents the logit regression used to estimate the propensity scores on the basis of which the matching is subsequently done. The results accord well with expectations from the simple averages in Table 1 . Trabajar participants are clearly poorer, as indicated by their housing, neighborhood, schooling, and their subjective perceptions of welfare and expected future prospects. The participation regression suggests that program participants are more likely to be males who are heads of households and married. Participants are likely to be longer-term residents of the locality rather than migrants from other areas. The model also predicts that (controlling for other characteristics) Trabajar participants are more likely to be members of political parties and neighborhood associations. This is not surprising given the design of the program, since social and political connections will no doubt influence the likelihood of being recruited into a successful sub-project proposal. However, participation rates in political parties and local groups are still low, even for Trabajar participants (Table 1) .
After estimating the propensity scores for the treated and the comparison group, we plotted them to check the common support condition. We found that there were regions of no overlapping support. We excluded non-participants in the non-overlapping regions.
Furthermore, since we had enough participants in each of the provinces, we tried to limit the bias due to location differences by matching within provinces only.
Based on Table 3 , the mean propensity score for the national sample is 0.075 (with a standard deviation of 0.125). This is of course much lower than the mean score for the Trabajar sample, which is of 0.405 (0.266). However, there is considerable overlap in support, with only 3% of nonparticipants having a score less than the lowest value for participants (suggesting that there is considerable unmet demand for work on the scheme). Figure 1 gives the histograms of estimated propensity scores for participants and nonparticipants. After matching, the comparison group of nearest neighbors drawn from the national sample has a mean score of 0.394 (standard deviation of 0.253), very close to that of the Trabajar sample. Tables 4 and 5 give our estimates of average income gains, and their incidence according to fractiles of households ranked by pre-intervention income per capita. The latter is not observed. To estimate it we first estimate the gain for each participating household by each of the three methods described in section 2.2. We then assign each household to a decile using the same decile bounds calibrated from the EDS (as used in Table 2 ), but this time the participants are assigned to the decile implied by their estimated pre-intervention income as given by actual income minus the estimated net gain.
The nearest neighbor estimate of the average gain is $157, about three-quarters of the Trabajar wage. The nearest five and non-parametric estimator give appreciably lower gains, of around $100. Comparing the standard errors across the three estimators we find that as expected, there is an increase in precision of the estimators when we move from the nearest neighbor to the non-parametric estimator. The difference in the standard errors between the nearest neighbor and the nearest five estimator is 16 percent. However, the difference in the standard errors between the nearest five and the non-parametric estimator is only 7 percent. Thus while there is an improvement in the precision of the estimates when we resort to "m-to-one" matching with m>1, the improvement is only modest compared to the increase in the number of matches. For this reason, computational convenience and to circumvent the small sample problem in the subgroup cases, the rest of the paper is based on the "nearest five" estimate.
The average gain using the "nearest five" estimator of $103 is about half of the average Trabajar wage. Given that there is sizable foregone income, the crude incidence numbers in Table 1 overestimate how pro-poor the program is, since pre-intervention income is lower than is implied by the net gains. Where this bias is most notable is amongst the poorest 5%; while the non-behavioral incidence analysis suggests that 40% of participant households are in the poorest 5%, the estimate factoring in foregone incomes is much lower at 10%. Nonetheless, over half of the participant households are in the poorest decile nationally even allowing for foregone incomes. Given that the poverty rate in Argentina is widely reckoned to be 20%, our results suggest that four out of five Trabajar participants are poor by Argentinean standards. , and are roughly constant after that. We will return later to interpret this finding. given that we have ruled out negative gains on a priori grounds.
The absolute gains are highest for the third decile, but do not vary greatly across the deciles containing participants. The percentage net gains are highest for the poorest, reaching 74% for the poorest 5%. In section 4.3 we will offer an interpretation of these findings.
Tables 7-9 report the net wage gains by fractiles of pre-intervention incomes for three different demographic groups: female participants, participants between the ages 15-24 years (typically identified as those who are new entrants into the job market), and workers in the age group 25-64 years.
The estimates in Table 7 are not consistent with the existence of income losses due to low female participation in the program. The net wage gains from the program accruing to female participants are virtually identical to the gains for male participants. However, the distribution of female participation is less pro-poor, as indicated by household income per capita; while over half of the members of participating families are in the poorest decile nationally, this is true of less than 40% of the members of female participants' families. This probably reflects lower wages for women in other work, making the Trabajar wage more attractive to the non-poor.
For the younger cohort however, the net gains are significantly higher (comparing Tables   8 and 9 ). Foregone incomes are lower for the young, probably reflecting their lack of experience in the labor market. Because of this, there would be income gains from higher participation by the young. (To the extent that any young participants leave school to join the program, future incomes may suffer.) This suggests that the older workers may well be favored in rationing Trabajar jobs. However, the distribution of gains is more pro-poor for the older workers, with almost 60% coming from the poorest decile. Pushing for higher participation by the young entails a short-term trade-off between average gains and a better distribution. It may also entail a longer-term trade off with future incomes of the young, by reducing schooling.
Economic Interpretation
Although we find that program participation falls off sharply as household income rises, the net gains conditional on participation do not fall amongst the upper half of the income distribution ( Figure 2 ). Since the program wage rate is about the same for all participants, foregone income amongst participants appears to be independent of family income above about $200 per person per month. This may be surprising at first sight. The standard model of selftargeting through work requirements postulates that foregone income tends to be higher for higher income groups (section 2.1).
We can offer the following explanation. The Trabajar wage is almost certainly too low to attract a worker out of a regular job. For a worker with such a job, let the foregone income from joining the program be f e (Y)>W where (as in section 2.1) Y is the pre-intervention income of the worker's household, W is the wage rate offered on the Trabajar program and the function f e is strictly increasing.
For an unemployed worker, however, only miscellaneous odd-jobs are available. Anyone can get this work, and it does not earn any more for someone from a well-off family than a poor one. Let this "odd-job" foregone income be f u <W and assume that f u is independent of Y. Let the rate of unemployment be U and assume that this is a decreasing function of Y; that is also consistent with the evidence for this setting (section 3). Average foregone income if one joins the program is then:
It is readily verified that, under our assumption, F(Y) is strictly increasing in Y, as in the standard model of self-targeting (section 2.1).
In this model, unemployed workers will want to participate in the program, while the employed will not be interested in participating (assuming that the alternative work is judged equal in other respects, although this can be relaxed without altering the main point of this model.) The program will successfully screen the two groups. We will see a fall in Trabajar participation as income rises, as in Table 4 . However, when we calculate the foregone income of actual participants we will get f u not F(Y). Measured net gains amongst actual participants will not vary systematically with pre-intervention income, even though self-targeting of the poor is excellent. Our finding that foregone income conditional on participation does not fall as income rises amongst the upper half of the distribution is consistent with good overall targeting through self-selection.
Conclusions
The assumptions made in program evaluations are often dictated by data availability. In assessing the gains from antipoverty programs-programs that are often set up rapidly in response to a crisis-it is common to only have access to a single cross-sectional survey done after the program is introduced. Propensity-score matching methods of evaluation combine a single cross-sectional survey of program participants with a comparable larger cross-sectional survey from which a comparison group is chosen. With sufficiently detailed cross-sectional data on both participants and non-participants, these methods can allow an assessment of behavioral responses without pre-intervention baseline data or randomization. The accuracy of this method will depend on how well one can assure that treatment and comparison groups come from the same economic environment and were given the same survey instrument. The method cannot rule out the possibility of selection bias due to unobserved differences between participants and even a well-matched comparison group.
We have applied recent advances in matching methods to Argentina's Trabajar Program.
While neither a baseline survey nor randomization were feasible options in this case, the program is well suited to matching methods.
We find that program participants are more likely to be poor than non-participants by a variety of both objective and subjective indicators. The participants tend to be less well educated, they tend to live in poorer neighborhoods, and they tend to be members of neighborhood associations and political parties. The relatively low wage rate clearly makes the program unattractive to the non-poor.
Using our model of program participation to find the best matches from the national sample for each Trabajar worker. We did not have to drop any participants from our sample in computing the impact estimator. This is probably the result of having a large group of nonparticipants from which we could draw our matches. We find that the precision of the matching impact estimators does improve when we use "m-to-one" matching with m>1.
However, the increase in the precision is moderate. Matching each participant to five nonparticipants does not reduce the standard errors five-fold. The reduction in the standard errors is even smaller when we compare the nearest five estimator to the non-parametric estimator which uses all the information in the nonparticipant sample.
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We have estimated the net income gain from the program by comparing the measured incomes of participants with those of the matched comparison group. We find that ignoring foregone incomes greatly overstates the average gains from the program, though sizable gains of about half the gross wage are still found. Even allowing for foregone incomes, the program's benefit incidence is decidedly pro-poor, reflecting the self-targeting feature of the programs' design. Average gains are very similar between men and women, but are higher for younger workers. Higher female participation would not enhance average income gains, and the distribution of the gains would worsen. Higher participation by the young would raise average gains, but also worsen the distribution.
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